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FROM WARREN TO REHNQUIST: THE
GROWING CONSERVATIVE TREND IN
THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT
OF CHILDREN
Historically, children as individuals have not been afforded
the same degree of constitutional protection as adults.' The Su-
preme Court, while acknowledging that the Constitution guaran-
tees certain individual rights to children,2 has generally not applied
stringent standards in determining whether the rights of children
have been abridged or denied.3 Traditionally, the Court's decisions
See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (state may require parental noti-
fication before dependant, unmarried minor may have abortion); see also Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (state may provide more re-
stricted right for minors to decide what sex material they will read); Keiter, Privacy, Chil-
dren, and Their Parents: Reflections on and Beyond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66
MINN. L. REv. 459, 467 (1982) (rights granted to children are not equal in extent to those
granted to adults); Note, California's Parental Consent Statute: A Constitutional Chal-
lenge, 40 HASrNuGs L.J. 169, 169 (1988) [hereinafter Note, California's Parental Consent
Statute] (historically, constitutional rights of minors have not been "coterminous" with
those of adults); Note, Children's Rights Under the Burger Court: Concern for the Child,
But Deference to Authority, 60 NoTRE DAmE L. RE V. 1214, 1215 (1985) [hereinafter Note,
Children's Rights Under the Burger Court] ("constitutional rights of children cannot be
equated with those of adults") (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979)).
2 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("[c]onstitutional
rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined
age of majority"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("neither the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone").
3 See L. TRmE, AMERicAN CONsTrruTIoNAL LAW § 16-31, at 1590 n.8 (2d ed. 1988). Al-
though the Bill of Rights guarantees some rights to minors, a "somewhat less rigorous test"
applies to a state's restrictions of a minor's rights. Id. "[A] significant state interest not
present in the case of an adult will suffice in lieu of a 'compelling justification.'" Id.; see
also Bellotti 443 U.S. at 634 ("constitutional principles [should] be applied with sensitivity
and flexibility to the special needs of children"); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75 (state required to
show only significant, as opposed to compelling, interest to limit minor's right to abortion);
Note, Children's Rights Under the Burger Court, supra note 1, at 1226 n.111 (Burger Court
vested broad discretionary power in states to regulate what limited rights it had given
children).
The Bellotti Court cited three reasons why the constitutional rights of children should
not equal those of adults: (1) "[The peculiar vulnerability of children;" (2) "their inability
to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and" (3) "the importance of the
parental role in child rearing." Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634; see also Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) ("power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches
beyond the scope of its authority over adults"); cf. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
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affecting the rights of children were based on the policy that par-
ents have the right to control the upbringing of their children free
from unreasonable state interference.4 Illustrating this traditional
view are two cases decided in the 1920's, Meyer v. Nebraska5 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.' In Meyer, a state statute that prohib-
ited the teaching of foreign languages to students before the ninth
grade was held unconstitutional because it interfered with both the
teacher's right to teach and the parents' right to control the educa-
tion of their children. 7 Similarly, in Pierce, a state statute that re-
quired parents to send their children to public rather than private
school was declared unconstitutional for unreasonably infringing
upon the privilege of parents to direct their children's education.,
Although in both instances the Court agreed that the state had
exceeded its authority to direct the actions of minors,9 the basis for
these decisions was not the protection of children's rights. Rather,
the Court determined that the state's power was limited by family
autonomy and parents' rights.10
In Prince v. Massachusetts," the Supreme Court, though reaf-
firming the traditional view, clarified the state's role in protecting
678, 693 (1977) (strict scrutiny does not apply to ban on sale or advertisement of contracep-
tives to minors).
' See Rush, The Warren and Burger Courts on State, Parent, and Child Conflict Reso-
lution: A Comparative Analysis and Proposed Methodology, 36 HASTINGs L.J. 461, 464
(1985) (parent-child relationship, though not completely immune from state regulation, has
been "viewed as sacrosanct" from "time immemorial"); see also Keiter, supra note 1, at 460
("[a]bsent parental abuse or neglect, the judiciary has traditionally limited its involvement
in the parent-child relationship").
6 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
6 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
1 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400. The Court held that the rights of teachers to teach their
students and of parents to educate their children are protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id. In addition, the statute was deemed arbitrary in that it failed to effect any legiti-
mate state interest. Id. at 403.
8 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-16, at 1299. In "[d]enying
that the child is 'the mere creature of the State,' ... [the Court] seemingly opined that the
child is entirely the creature of 'those who nurture him and direct his destiny' .... " Id.
(quoting Pierce).
' See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 ("there are no peculiar circumstances or present emergen-
cies which demand extraordinary measures relative to primary education"); Meyer, 262 U.S.
at 403 ("[n]o emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of some language
other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition").
10 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (parents have right, coupled with high duty, to bring up
and educate their children); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403 (nearly all states enforce parents' natu-
ral duty to give their children suitable education by compulsory laws).
11 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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minors.12 The Court in Prince determined that a Jehovah's Wit-
ness had violated a state statute prohibiting child labor when she
allowed her niece to sell religious pamphlets on a street-corner.' 3
The Court held that although the "care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents,"' 4 the state may limit parents' rights in
order to protect the well-being of the minor."5
The traditional view, encompassing both the family's right to
privacy and the notion that the parent generally acts in the best
interests of the child,"6 has never been discredited and, in fact, has
served as the foundation for several modern opinions. 7 In certain
other decisions, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the family situation is not always ideal and has emphasized the
distinct rights of a minor,' 8 or alternatively, has substituted the
state as parens patriae'9 in the place of a parent or guardian.20
12 See id. at 166-69.
13 Id. at 160. The child testified that she believed that it was her duty to sell the reli-
gious pamphlets or be condemned to "everlasting destruction." Id. at 162-63. The Court's
decision to hold the child's guardian liable turned on the competing rights of parents to
encourage children in the practice of religious beliefs and of the state in protecting the
welfare of a child. See id. at 165. The rights of children to exercise their religion were only
briefly mentioned. See id.
14 Id. at 166.
15 Id. The Court held that child labor is an evil that is within the state's police power to
regulate, even in opposition to the parents' wishes. Id. at 168-69.
is Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("natural bonds of affection lead parents to
act in the best interests of their children"); Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 ("decisions have
respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter"). But see Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972) (warning that parents' failure to give children neces-
sary care, support, and attention may lead to state intervention and deprivation of parents'
authority).
17 See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981) ("basic in the structure of our
society" to recognize claim of parental authority in their own household to direct rearing of
their children); Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (parents have right and obligation to prepare child
for life).
Is See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967) (fifteen-year-old juvenile delinquent is
entitled to due process of law).
19 See BLAcK's LAW DICTiONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). Literally "parent of the country,"
the term parens patriae traditionally refers to the role of the state as sovereign and guard-
ian of persons under legal disability. Id.; see also Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice:
Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 mnN. L. REv. 141, 148 (1984) ("legal justifi-
cation for intervention was parens patriae-the right and responsibility of the state to sub-
stitute its own control over children... when the [natural parents] were unable or unwilling
to meet their responsibilities"); Keiter, supra note 1, at 498 (legal basis for state to protect
those who do not have capacity to protect themselves). See generally Custer, The Origins of
the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORy L.J. 195 (1978) (brief study of medieval English
common-law origins of concept of parens patriae).
20 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (citations omitted) (with
regard to regulating dissemination of child pornography, a "[s]tate's interest in 'safeguard-
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This Note will discuss the Supreme Court's treatment of chil-
dren's rights, focusing primarily on decisions relating to juvenile
delinquents, a minor's right to obtain an abortion without her par-
ents' knowledge, and the testimony of a child witness in a sexual
abuse case. The discussion will begin with the development of chil-
dren's individual rights during the Warren era and the Burger
Court's occasional return to the traditional view. This Note will
then explore recent decisions of the Rehnquist Court and will sug-
gest that the conservative trend apparent in the Court's recent de-
cisions will continue to the detriment of children's individual
rights.
I. RECOGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
A. The Warren Court: 1953-1969
The development of children's individual rights began with
the Warren Court, most notably in 1967, when In re Gault2 estab-
lished the principle that constitutional protections extend to chil-
dren as well as adults.22 In Gault, a minor had been arrested for
making an obscene phone call.2 The police held and questioned
the minor without giving formal notice to his parents.2 4 At a hear-
ing to determine whether the minor's parents should retain cus-
tody, the complainant did not appear, there was no sworn testi-
mony, and no transcript was taken. 5 Notwithstanding the
hearing's failure to satisfy fundamental due process requirements,
the Court proceeded to commit the minor to a state industrial
ing the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is compelling"); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (striking down statute that required parental consent before
minor could obtain abortion and outlining judicial bypass procedure for circumventing pa-
rental consent).
21 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
22 See id. at 13 ("neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone"); see also Keiter, supra note 1, at 467 (soon after Gault, certain other constitutional
protections were extended to include children).
11 Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. At the time of his arrest, the defendant was on probation for
having been in the presence of another minor who had stolen a woman's wallet. Id. At his
hearing before the juvenile court, Gault testified that he only dialed the telephone number
and that his companion had made the lewd remarks. Id. at 7.
24 Id. at 5. Gault's mother received notice of her son Gerald's arrest from her older son,
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26
school for six years.
The juvenile delinquency system under which Gault's case had
been prosecuted was a product of the "Progressive Movement,"
which originated around the turn of the century." The theory be-
hind the system is that criminal behavior by minors is attributable
to "environmental pressures (or lack of them) or ... other forces
beyond their control."2 Accordingly, the system focuses on the ref-
ormation of offenders rather than on their punishment.2 To this
end, juvenile court proceedings have been cast in a civil rather
than a criminal light,30 thus granting judges much more discretion
than they would enjoy in ordinary criminal trials.31
28 Id. at 7-8. The provision under which Gerald Gault was convicted, if violated by an
adult, would have resulted in a fine of five to fifty dollars or not more than two months of
incarceration. Id. at 8-9.
27 See Feld, supra note 19, at 142-46. Between 1870 and World War I, the Industrial
Revolution in America brought about significant economic development. Id. at 142-43. As
the United States developed from an agrarian to an industrial society, the Progressives rec-
ognized the effects of urban decay and embarked on a program of "child-saving"; their influ-
ence contributed to the passage of child welfare, child labor, and compulsory school attend-
ance laws, and to the development of a juvenile court system. Id. at 143-46; see also W.
LAFAvE & A. ScOTr, CRimiNAL LAW 398-402 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter LAFAvE & Scorr]. All
jurisdictions have laws providing that some or all criminal conduct committed by persons
under a certain age must be adjudicated in juvenile court rather than criminal court. Id. at
398. Juvenile courts deal with neglected and dependent children, as well as with juvenile
delinquents. Id. at 400.
26 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551-52 (1971) (White, J., concurring).
29 See Feld, supra note 19, at 146-47. The "protective" theme inherent to the juvenile
justice system reflected changes in some of the basic assumptions about the sources of crimi-
nal conduct. See id. at 146. The system functioned upon the theory of parens patriae. Id. at
148. The actual events that brought the minor before the court were secondary to issues
involving the child's background and welfare, and did not affect the degree or duration of
the court's intervention. Id. at 151. Because the needs of each child differed, no limit to the
state's involvement could be defined in advance of each prosecution. Id. The Progressive
influence, however, was significantly diminished beginning with the Gault case, in which the
juvenile delinquent's procedural due process rights were protected in spite of his minority.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 21.
3o See Feld, supra note 19, at 149. The civil nature of the juvenile proceedings allowed
the courts to reach many noncriminal actions committed by minors, such as smoking, sexual
activity, truancy, and vagrancy. Id. Known as "status jurisdiction," it authorized the court
to intervene at an earlier, predelinquent stage in order to increase the success of rehabilita-
tion. Id. at 149-50; see also LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 27, at 38 ("a civil rather than a
criminal matter, calling for treatment instead of punishment").
1 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 283 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (very few
limits on judge's discretion; there are no guidelines or procedural constraints on judge
before he denies juvenile's liberty); see also Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New
Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. Rav. 503, 516 (1984) ("court was empowered to determine the
'needs' of the child, and its inquiries were not limited to examination and adjudication of
criminal conduct").
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Although they were afforded some protections not available to
adult offenders, juveniles were denied many basic due process pro-
tections.3 2 In Gault, the Supreme Court began reforming the sys-
tem by setting aside the minor's conviction and holding that while
a juvenile hearing need not "conform with all of the requirements
of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing...,
[it] must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment."3 The Court noted that failure by the juvenile courts
"to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has re-
sulted in instances . . . of unfairness to individuals, ' 3 4 and con-
cluded that requiring adherence to these safeguards is necessary
"to protect a juvenile accused ... on a charge under which he can
be imprisoned for a term of years.""
The constitutional rights of children were addressed in a dif-
ferent context by the Warren Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School District." In Tinker, the Court up-
held a minor's right to demonstrate his objection to the Vietnam
war by wearing black armbands in school. 7 Finding the protest to
32 See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 29. The only difference between the procedure in Gerald
Gault's adjudication and an adult proceeding was that Gerald was afforded none of the
fourteenth amendment protections adults receive. Id.; see also Walkover, supra note 31, at
516 ("[a]n accused child received few if any of the traditional procedural protections re-
quired in the adult criminal court").
It has been stated in dicta that a juvenile is entitled only to the fundamental due pro-
cess right of fair treatment, and is not entitled to other elements of due process such as bail,
indictment by a grand jury, a speedy and public trial, trial by jury, immunity against self-
incrimination, right to confrontation, and, in some jurisdictions, right to counsel. Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). On the other hand, juveniles are afforded a number
of protections that are unavailable to adult offenders. Id. at 556-57. The Supreme Court has
specifically noted that juveniles are generally shielded from publicity and are only confined
until majority. Id. at 556. The Court has also recognized that juvenile court judges prefer to
allow minors to remain in the custody of their parents and that "[tihe child is protected
against consequences of adult conviction such as the loss of civil rights, the use of adjudica-
tion against him in subsequent proceedings, and disqualification.for public employment."
Id. at 556-57. But see-Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317 (1974) (permitting defense attorney
to bring in prior juvenile convictions of minor witness during cross-examination).
11 Gault, 387 U.S. at 30.
34 Id. at 19.
11 Id. at 60 (Black, J., concurring). The specific due process protections granted to
juveniles included: (1) notice of the charges setting forth the allegations with particularity;
(2) notice to the child and parents of the child's right to counsel or appointed counsel; (3) a
privilege against self-incrimination; and, (4) absent a confession, a requirement that testi-
mony be sworn and an opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 31-57.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
,' Id. at 514. The school board had advance notice of the student's plan to wear the
armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. Id. at 504. The board passed a resolution provid-
1144 [Vol. 65:1139
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be a passive expression that did not interfere with the right or
ability of school officials to maintain discipline and normal school
operations,38 the Court held that students "may not be confined to
the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.
3 9
B. The Burger Court: 1969-1986
Consideration of the individual rights of children continued
during the tenure of Chief Justice Burger.4" During this era, the
state became an important player in determining the rights of chil-
dren, occasionally even to the exclusion of the parent.41 In the area
ing that anyone wearing an armband would be asked to remove it and then would be sent
home until he or she agreed to return without it. Id.
Id. at 506-09. Although the Court noted the traditional deference granted to school
officials in controlling school conduct, it held that "fear or apprehension of disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Id. at 508.
"Id. at 511. The Warren Court held explicitly that first amendment rights apply to
both teachers and students in the school environment and that neither group "shed[s] their
constitutional rights to [either] freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
Id. at 506. According to the Court, absent "a specific showing of constitutionally valid rea-
sons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views."
Id. at 511.
40 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975).
In Pico, a school board sought to remove nine books from the shelves of a school library
because they were purportedly anti-American and "just plain filthy." Pico, 457 U.S. at 857.
In curtailing the right of the school board to remove the books, the Court held that removal
would be unconstitutional if the board's reason for denying students access to the books was
to shield them from ideas that the board decided were objectionable. Id. at 872. The Court,
however, was unwilling to rule that the school board could not remove "pervasively vulgar"
books from the library. Id. at 871.
In Goss, several high school students from the Columbia Public School system were
suspended from school without a hearing. Goss, 419 U.S. at 567. The Court concluded that
in this situation due process requires, "[a]t the very minimum .... [that] students facing
suspension and the [possible] interference with a protected property interest must be given
some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." Id. at 579 (emphasis in original).
The Court observed that a public education is not a constitutionally mandated right, but
held that since the state had elected to extend the right to an education, it could not with-
draw that right on grounds of misconduct "absent fundamentally fair procedures to deter-
mine whether the misconduct... [actually] occurred." Id. at 574. According to the Burger
Court, a student is entitled to notice, whether written or oral, of the charges against him. Id.
at 580. Also, if the student denies the charges, he must be afforded a chance to explain his
side of the story to the authorities. Id.
41 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 641-44 (1979) (minor may obtain abortion with-
out parental consent by utilizing legislatively enacted judicial bypass procedure); Rush,
supra note 4, at 470 ("Burger Court has shifted the balance of power from the family to the
state"); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773-74 (1982) (upholding statute al-
lowing state to prohibit distribution of material depicting sexual performance by minor
under age sixteen, even though material not legally obscene); cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
11451991]
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of juvenile delinquency, for example, the Court, proceeding from
Gault, undertook the task of defining which constitutional protec-
tions were necessary to afford juveniles the "essence of due pro-
cess."42 As a result, in addition to the protections afforded to mi-
nors by Gault,43 the Burger Court determined that juveniles are
protected against double jeopardy" and that conviction of a minor
requires proof of guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt. '45 The Court
also concluded, however, that juveniles are not entitled to a trial
by jury." The denial of the right to a jury trial seemed to signify
584, 604-06 (1979) (parents may voluntarily commit their child to institutional mental
health facility without formal hearing, but inquiry by "neutral factfinder" required to deter-
mine whether statutory requirements for admission are met).
See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 35 and accompanying text (enumerating protections given to minors
by Gault).
44 See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975). A minor arrested for robbery received
an adjudicative hearing in juvenile court, and upon the judge's finding that the allegations
in the petition relating to the robbery were true, the proceedings were continued for a dispo-
sitional hearing. Id. at 522. At the hearing two weeks later, however, the minor was trans-
ferred to criminal court to be prosecuted as an adult. Id. at 523-24. The Supreme Court,
ignoring the "civil" label placed on juvenile proceedings, found that the minor had already
been put in jeopardy and thus could not be subjected to adjudication twice for the same
offense. Id. at 529-33.
41 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In Winship, a minor was accused of stealing
one hundred and twelve dollars from a woman's purse, an act that would constitute larceny
if committed by an adult. Id. at 360. After a hearing before a New York Family Court,
"[t]he judge acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, but rejected ... [the defendant's] contention that such proof was required by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. The judge instead applied the New York Family Court Act,
which required that guilt be proven by the lesser standard of a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Id. The Supreme Court, in rejecting application of the preponderance standard, rea-
soned that "[t]he same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to pro-
tect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child." Id. at 365. One commentator
observed that Winship "placed the concept of criminal culpability at the heart of the juve-
nile proceeding," for if the goals of the juvenile system were rehabilitation and treatment
alone, a standard of review more lenient than proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" would
suffice to effectuate those goals. See Walkover, supra note 31, at 521-22; see also Feld, supra
-note 19, at 244 (application of this highest standard of review protects against conviction of
innocent persons).
4' See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). Although the sixth amend-
ment guarantees the right to a jury "in all criminal prosecutions," it does not follow that a
jury is required in a juvenile court hearing, since such a hearing is not considered a "crimi-
nal prosecution" within the meaning of the sixth amendment. Id. at 540-41. The emphasis
in a juvenile proceeding is factfinding, and the Burger Court refused to say that a jury is a
necessary component of accurate factfinding. Id. at 543. The Court expressed a fear that a
jury would turn the juvenile court hearing into a fully adversarial proceeding and thereby
undermine many of the benefits of the flexible juvenile system. Id. at 545. But see Feld,
supra note 19, at 241-46. There is a greater risk of prejudice when there is no jury. Id. at
241. Since the judge is both the trier of fact and the one who rules on the admissibility of
1146
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that while the Court sought to prevent the type of disregard for
procedure evidenced in Gault,47 it was reluctant to completely
abandon an informal, nonadversarial juvenile system by extending
to delinquents all of the due process protections afforded to
adults.48
In addition to the plight of the juvenile delinquent, the Burger
Court was confronted with children's issues that had never previ-
ously been addressed.49 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,50 the
Court struck down a state statute that required parental consent
before any unmarried girl under the age of eighteen could obtain
an abortion.51 The Court found that although the making of cer-
tain decisions may be beyond the capacity of the average minor to
act in her own best interests,52 a blanket third-party veto of a juve-
nile's decision to have an abortion cannot withstand constitutional
scrutiny.53 The Court in Danforth, by concluding that "[a]ny inde-
evidence, there is a grave danger that inadmissible evidence will affect the outcome of the
proceeding. Id. at 241-43. It has been suggested that hearings to determine the admissibility
of evidence be conducted prior to trial before a judge other than the one deciding the facts.
See id. at 241 n.383.
47 387 U.S. at 4-11; see also supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
48 See Keiter, supra note 1, at 467-68; Note, Children's Rights Under the Burger
Court, supra note 1, at 1223 ("not all constitutional rights are to be enforced in the juvenile
justice context").
Four characteristics delineate the "new" juvenile law:. (1) in many jurisdictions account-
ability and punishment (as opposed to reformation and rehabilitation) have emerged as ex-
press purposes in juvenile statutes; (2) much of the law comports with dictates of due pro-
cess; (3) jurisdiction is limited to offenses that would be crimes if committed by adults; and
(4) there is a movement toward weighing issues of culpability and accountability more heav-
ily in waiver and dispositional decisions. Walkover, supra note 31, at 523-24.
1, See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
50 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
"I Id. at 74. In 1973, the Burger Court held that a woman's right to have an abortion is
constitutionally protected. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Writing for the Court,
Justice Blackmun noted that although the Constitution does not explicitly contain a right of
privacy, such a right has been impliedly recognized for some time. Id. at 152-53. Justice
Blackmun cautioned, however, that while the right to privacy "is broad enough to encom-
pass a woman's decision ... to terminate her pregnancy," id. at 153, it "cannot be said to be
absolute." Id. at 154.
While the Court in Danforth recognized that juveniles as well as adults possess a right
of privacy, it also stated that to assure their welfare, the law "may subject minors to more
stringent limitations than are permissible with respect to adults." Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72.
52 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72. The Court noted the existence of "statutes proscribing the
sale of firearms and deadly weapons to minors without parental consent, and other statutes
relating to minors' exposure to certain types of literature, the purchase by pawnbrokers of
property from minors, and the sale of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages to minors." Id.
53 Id. at 74. Justice Stewart suggested, however, that a provision calling for a judicial
forum for parent-child disputes might pass constitutional muster. Id. at 90-91 (Stewart, J.,
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1139
pendent interest the parent may have regarding the termination of
the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right
of privacy of the competent minor, ' 54 dramatically altered the
traditional view of the parents' right to control the actions of their
minor child. 5
Three years after Danforth, the Supreme Court considered an-
other parental consent statute and outlined a judicial bypass pro-
cedure that would render such a statute constitutional.5 6 In Bel-
lotti v. Baird,5 7 the Court held that a minor is entitled to a judicial
hearing, conducted without her parent's knowledge, to show either
that she is mature enough to make the abortion decision herself,58
or alternatively, to prove that it is within her best interests to have
the abortion without informing her parents.5 9 The Court further
concurring). He noted that this would encourage consultation between parent and child
without imposing parental approval as an absolute condition. Id. at 91 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
For cases upholding bypass provisions similar to the one suggested by Justice Stewart,
see generally Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 493 (1983) (upholding
statute with such judicial bypass provision); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981)
(statute requiring parental notice, not parental consent, upheld).
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
55 By subordinating the interests of the parent to those of the child, the Burger Court
seemed to recognize the child as an individual with constitutionally protected rights. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 3, § 15-10, at 1344 (regardless of age, blanket requirement of third party
consent to woman's decision to abort is unconstitutional); Note, California's Parental Con-
sent Statute, supra note 1, at 170 (the Court has recognized a minor's qualified right to
abortion); see also Note, Children's Rights Under the Burger Court, supra note 1, at 1228
(citations omitted) ("Court has vested children with a 'right of choice' "). But see id. at 1226
(Burger Court had significant difficulty "resolving the clash between the interests of chil-
dren and the interests of parents .... not consistently resolv[ing] this conflict in favor of
either").
51 See infra 57-60 and accompanying text.
5- 443 U.S. 622 (1979). The Massachusetts statute required the consent of both parents
before an unmarried minor under age eighteen could have an abortion. Id. at 625. If paren-
tal consent was refused, the minor could go to court and, "for good cause shown," receive
judicial consent. Id. After certifying questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, the United States Supreme Court found that, according to this statute, an unmarried
minor could not seek judicial consent without first seeking parental consent. Id. at 630.
Furthermore, even if the minor was found to be capable of making this decision, the judge
was entitled to withhold consent if he or she felt that an abortion would not be in the best
interest of the child. Id.
88 Id. at 643.
5 Id. at 644. The Massachusetts statute failed to pass constitutional muster both be-
cause there was no way for a minor to obtain judicial consent without first informing her
parents and because the judge could arbitrarily deny a mature minor the choice to have an
abortion. Id. at 651; cf. id. at 653-54 (Stevens, J., concurring) (any consent statute, regard-
less of judicial bypass subjects minor to third party veto); Keiter, supra note 1, at 474-75
(discussion of Justice Steven's concerns in Bellotti).
1148
1991] FROM WARREN TO REHNQUIST 1149
determined that the procedure must ensure the minor's anonymity
and be expedited through the trial court and appellate levels.60
Although the Court had apparently ensured a minor's right to
privacy in Bellotti, the Burger Court appeared to retreat toward a
more traditional view of family relations in H.L. v. Matheson."1 In
Matheson, the Court upheld a statute requiring parental notifica-
tion, but not consent, before a minor could obtain an abortion, de-
spite the fact that the statute lacked a judicial bypass provision.62
Although the Court carefully limited its holding to immature and
unemancipated minors,63 its approval of a parental notification
statute with no judicial alternatives effectively amounted to a rein-
forcement of the traditional right of parents to control the up-
bringing of their children. 4
Two cases decided by the Burger Court in 1983, however, ad-
hered more closely to the DanforthBellotti model than to the
traditional view resurrected in Matheson.5 In Planned Parent-
hood Ass'n v. Ashcroft,66 a judicial bypass provision similar to the
The "mature minor," and "best interests" standards attempted to reconcile several
competing interests:
the state and the parental interests of protecting immature minors from improvi-
dent abortion decisions; the state and parental interests in strengthening the fam-
ily unit; the state interest in allowing an immature minor to obtain a confidential
abortion when her family situation indicates that such confidentiality serves her
best interest; and a mature minor's interest in exercising her fundamental right.
Note, California's Parental Consent Statute, supra note 1, at 182.
60 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644.
81 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
62 Id. at 409-10. In Matheson, a minor discovered that she was pregnant and was ad-
vised by a doctor that it was in her best medical interests to have an abortion. Id. at 400.
Because the girl was unmarried and fifteen, the state statute required that the doctor notify
one of her parents, even though a social worker determined that it would not be in her best
interest. Id. at 400-01. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, criticized the Court for hinting that
more carefully drawn pleadings could lead to a successful challenge. Id. at 425-26 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). He also condemned the state for putting obstacles in the minor's way with-
out demonstrating that they were closely tailored to a "significant state interest." Id. at 441
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 406.
64 See id. at 410. A mere parental notice requirement does not violate the rights of the
minor, for it is "basic in the structure of our society" to recognize the parents' claim of
authority in their own household to direct the upbringing of their children. Id. (quoting
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)); see also Keiter, supra note 1, at 478 (two
sets of interests involved: (1) preventing child from making bad decision; and (2) reinforcing
parental role in child-rearing); Note, Children's Rights Under the Burger Court, supra note
1, at 1230-31 (Burger Court retreated from Bellotti and went back to traditional role of
parents as counselor to child).
65 See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
462 U.S. 476 (1983).
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one outlined in Bellotti 7 was upheld.6 8 Similarly, the Court in Ak-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health'9 struck down a
blanket provision requiring the written consent of one parent
before a girl under the age of fifteen could obtain an abortion.70
II. THE REHNQUIST COURT
In 1986, a new era in Supreme Court history began when Jus-
tice Rehnquist was appointed Chief Justice in place of Chief Jus-
tice Burger.7 1 The Court continues to be confronted with new is-
sues involving children, such as the difficulties encountered in
obtaining the testimony of the child-victim in a sexual abuse
case.72 At the same time, the Court has sought to define the pa-
rameters of previously established children's rights.73 During re-
cent years, increasing public awareness of the tragedy of sexually
abused children and frustration over the problems associated with
the prosecution of the alleged abusers have led state legislatures to
enact statutes designed to remove some of the most serious obsta-
cles to prosecuting these cases. 74 A problem often encountered in
6 See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. Pursuant to the Missouri statute, a
minor under the age of eighteen who was seeking an abortion was required to give her in-
formed, written consent. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 479 n.4. In addition, the statute required
the consent of at least one parent unless the minor was emancipated, granted the right to
self-consent, or granted consent by a court order. Id. at 479-80 n.4.
68 Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490-91. "A [s]tate's interest in protecting immature minors will
sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either parental or judicial," but the state
must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate "matur-
ity" or "best interests." Id. The Court in Ashcroft held that constitutional infirmities were
avoided because the judge's discretion was limited in, that a denial of judicial consent re-
quired a showing of "good cause." Id. at 493.
66 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
'o Id. at 441-42. The Akron, Ohio ordinance, id. at 422-25 nn.2-8, six provisions of
which were struck down as unconstitutional, was a pervasive abortion statute that sought to
regulate the informed consent of both adult women and minors before an abortion could be
performed. Id. at 422-51. Among the provisions condemned by the Court was one which
required the "attending physician" to provide the minor with information regarding the
risks of her pregnancy and the abortion techniques to be employed. Id. at 446. The Court
concluded that "we cannot say that the woman's consent to the abortion will not be in-
formed if a physician delegates the counseling task to another qualified individual." Id. at
448.
71 See G. GUNTHER, CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW app. B, at B-6 to B-7 (12th ed. 1991).
72 See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
7" See Comment, LB 90 and the Confrontation Clause: The Use of Videotaped and In
Camera Testimony in Criminal Trials to Accommodate Child Witnesses, 68 NEB. L. RE.
372, 397 (1989). "Although many cases of child sexual abuse are reported in the United
States, a significant percentage of child abuse cases are either dismissed before trial or re-
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sexual abuse cases is that the victim's testimony may be the only
existing evidence of the crime. Many states, recognizing the trau-
matic effect that testifying can have on children in these circum-
stances, have enacted statutes containing alternative procedures to
open-court testimony.76 The alternatives employed, however, have
suit in acquittals as a result of problems in getting the child to testify." Id. "Growing public
awareness of the problems associated with the prosecution of sex abuse cases has led many
states to alter their rules of evidence and criminal procedure." Id. at 373; see generally
Note, Sexually Abused Children: The Best Kept Legal Secret, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HuM. RTs.
ANN. 441, 446 (1986) ("it is estimated that only 24 percent of all child sexual abuse cases
nationwide result in criminal actions").
For examples of cases involving the rights of minors as witnesses in sexual abuse cases
and the problems associated with their prosecution, see generally Kentucky v. Stincer, 482
U.S. 730 (1987); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); cf. Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
In Stincer, the defendant was charged with three counts of first degree sodomy involv-
ing three minors. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 732. Prior to trial, a competency hearing was con-
ducted for two of the children. Although the defendant's attorney was allowed to attend the
hearing, the defendant himself was excluded. Id. at 732-33. In appealing his conviction, the
defendant asserted that his exclusion from the hearing violated his right to confrontation.
Id. at 735. The Supreme Court, while agreeing that the hearing was a critical phase of the
trial, nevertheless denied the defendant's confrontation clause objection because no substan-
tive evidentiary questions are asked during a competency hearing and because the defend-
ant was given the chance to face and cross-examine the witnesses at trial. Id. at 740.
Similarly, the defendant in Ritchie, accused of sexually abusing his daughter, claimed
that his sixth amendment right to confrontation was-violated when he was denied access to
the office records of the social agency that had reported him. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 43-45. The
Court held that the defendant's right to coifrontation was protected because he had the
opportunity to cross-examine his daughter. Id. at 54. In addition, the Court determined that
the state has a compelling interest in protecting the information gathered on child abuse. Id.
at 60-61. Recognizing the difficulty involved in detecting the abuse and prosecuting the
abuser, the Court concluded that it "is essential that the child have a state-designated per-
son to whom they can turn" with confidentiality. Id. at 60.
In the earlier Globe case, however, while the court noted the compelling interests of the
state in protecting victims from child abuse and encouraging them to come forward, it
struck down a statute that made it mandatory to close the courtroom to the press and pub-
lic during a trial of any sexual offense involving a child-victim. Globe, 457 U.S. at 607-11.
75 See Comment, The Young Victim as Witness for the Prosecution: Another Form of
Abuse?, 89 DICK L. Rlv. 721, 731 (1985) (because of nature of sexual conduct, prosecutors
often left with no evidence other than testimony of minor).
7' See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3167-68 (1990). Thirty-seven states have
statutes that permit a child victim of sexual abuse to testify by way of videotaped testi-
mony; twenty-four states allow the use of one-way closed circuit television; eight states allow
the use of two-way closed circuit television. Id.
For examples of states statutes allowing use of videotape, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g
(1991); FLA. STAT. § 92.53 (1991); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2163 a(5) (West Supp. 1991-
92); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2163(5) & (6) (Callaghan 1990 & Supp. 1991-92); VT. R. Evm.
807(d) (Supp. 1990). For examples of state statutes allowing one-way closed-circuit televi-
sion, see ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 278, § 16D (West
Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1991). For examples of state stat-
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often led to sixth amendment confrontation clause objections by
the adult defendants. 7
In 1988, the Supreme Court considered such an objection in
Coy v. Iowa 8 and struck down a state statute that, because of a
legislative presumption of trauma, allowed for a screen to be
placed between the defendant and the witness during the child-
victim's testimony.79 In striking down the statute, the Court stated
that it was "difficult to imagine a more obvious or damaging viola-
tion of the defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter."' 0 The
utes allowing use of two-way closed-circuit television, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West
Supp. 1991), N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00 to 65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1991); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (Supp. 1991).
The federal courts have also recognized the difficulties encountered when a particularly
young minor must testify in court. See FED. R. Evm. 807. With regard to minors under age
twelve who are witnesses in sexual abuse cases, if the court finds that as a result of testifying
the minor will suffer "severe emotional or psychological harm," the court may allow the
minor to testify by closed circuit television or videotape. Id.; see also C. MCCORMCK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 297 (E. Cleary 3d ed. Supp. 1987) (explaining FED. R. Evm.
807).
7 See supra note 74. The sixth amendment states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to ... be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
The right to confrontation predates the Constitution and is generally recognized as in-
cluding both a defendant's right to a face-to-face meeting with his accuser and his right to
cross-examine the witnesses brought against him. See Comment, Videotaped Child Testi-
mony and the Confrontation Clause: Are They Reconcilable?, 14 U. DAYRON L. REv. 361,
365 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, Videotaped Child Testimony]. The defendant's right of
cross-examination is usually deemed satisfied if an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
nesses is given; the cross-examination itself need not actually take place. See C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 76, § 252, at 751.
The English trial of Sir Walter Raleigh provides clear evidence of a defendant's need
for the right to confrontation. See Comment, Maryland's Child Abuse Testimony Statute:
Is Protecting the Child Witness Constitutional?, 49 MD. L. REv. 463, 464 (1990). Sir Raleigh
was tried for political treason, a capital offense, on the basis of a confession that had been
beaten out of an alleged co-conspirator. Id. This co-conspirator, however, later repudiated
the confession in a letter to Sir Raleigh. Id. Raleigh's request to confront and cross-examine
the witness at his trial was denied, and he was convicted and later executed. Id.
78 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). The appellant had been charged with sexually assaulting two
thirteen-year-old girls, neither of whom were able to describe the face of their attacker. Id.
at 1014.
" Id. at 1014-15. The defendant argued that placing a screen between him and the
witness made him appear guilty to the jury and denied him the right to face his accuser. Id.
at 1015. Lighting adjustments were made in the courtroom so that the defendant could
"dimly" perceive the witness, but so that the child could not see the defendant at all. Id. at
1014-15.
10 Id. at 1020. The Court held "[tihat face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset
the truthful rape victim or the abused child; but by the same token it may confound and
undo the false accuser, or reveal the child couched by a malevolent adult." Id. The theory
behind a face-to-face meeting and cross-examination is to ensure the truthfulness of the
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Court indicated, however, that while the statute failed because of
its blanket presumption of trauma, children do in fact have a right
to be protected from their accused abusers."'
More recently, the Rehnquist Court upheld the child's right to
protection in Maryland v. Craig.8 2 In Craig, the defendant, who
owned and operated a kindergarten and prekindergarten center,
was charged with sexually abusing a number of children who had
attended the center.83 At trial, the victims were allowed to testify
via one-way closed circuit television. 4 The statutory requirement
that an individualized finding of trauma be made before allowing
the minors to testify outside of the courtroom satisfied the con-
cerns expressed by the Court in Coy,' and the procedure itself en-
sured the reliability of the testimony presented. 8 The Court deter-
mined that the state, by showing on a case-specific basis that each
child-witness would be traumatized by the presence of the defend-
ant, had adequately demonstrated that its interest in protecting
the children was sufficiently important to justify this limitation on
testimony by "emphasizing the seriousness of the matter... [, thereby] guarding against
the chances of perjury." See Comment, Videotaped Child Testimony, supra note 77, at 385.
81 See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021 ("there have been no individualized findings that these
particular witnesses needed special protection"); see also id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) ("if a court makes a case-specific finding of necessity ... our cases suggest that the
strictures of the Confrontation Clause may give way to the compelling state interest of pro-
tecting child witnesses"); Note, Closed Circuit Television and Videotape Transmission of
Child Sexual Assault Victim's Testimony, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 165, 181 (1989) (Coy
rejected statutory presumption of trauma in all cases, not policy of protecting children).
82 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
83 Id. at 3160.
" Id. at 3160-61. The Maryland statute under consideration requires that the child's
testimony be taken in a separate room during the proceeding. Id. at 3161 n.1. Only the
prosecuting attorney, the defense counsel, and the judge may question the witness, and the
only people allowed in the room with the child during the questioning are the two attorneys,
the operators of the closed circuit television, and a person whose presence "contributes to
the well-being of the child." Id. According to the statute, the judge and the defendant must
be in the courtroom and they must be able to communicate with the persons in the room
electronically. Id.
85 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. In Craig, before the procedure was in-
voked, the judge heard an expert, who had interviewed the minor, testify that if forced to
take the stand with the defendant present, the child would "suffer serious emotional dis-
tress" and would not "be able to communicate effectively." Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3161.
8 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167. The procedure in question afforded the defendant the "es-
sence" of confrontation, "including the right to observe, cross-examine, and have the jury
observe the demeanor of the witness." Id. at 3162. The presence of these elements "ade-
quately ensures that the testimony is both reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial test-
ing." Id. at 3166. See generally Christiansen, The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fan-
tasy, and the Influence of Pretrial Interviews, 62 WASH. L. REv. 705, 709-11 (1987)
(discussing ability of young children to accurately testify to events they remember).
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the defendant's right to confrontation. 7
The Court's recognition of a child's right to protection in sex-
ual abuse cases contrasts with the increasingly restrictive view it
has taken regarding children's rights in general."' Its treatment of
juvenile criminals, for example, clearly illustrates that the Supreme
Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist is less generous than the
Court had previously been in recognizing the rights of minors. 9
In recent years, the American public has expressed extreme
outrage over the ever-rising juvenile crime rate and the increas-
ingly serious nature of the crimes committed by minors. ° A num-
ber of states have responded to this problem by transferring mi-
nors who commit particularly serious offenses to the criminal
system, in which they are treated as adults.91 This approach to the
juvenile crime problem has forced the Court to confront the ques-
tion of whether a minor may properly be subjected to the same
penalties that adults would face for similar offenses. The Court has
responded by concluding that while it may be "cruel and unusual
punishment" for a fifteen-year-old teenager, 2 the death penalty
See Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3168-69.
See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988). In
Kuhimeier, several high-school students sued their school principal in response to his deci-
sion to delete from a student newspaper two pages that he found objectionable. Id. at 262-
64. The newspaper was published as part of the regular curriculum of a journalism class. Id.
at 262. The articles deemed harmful concerned the experiences of three pregnant girls in
school and a student's reactions to her parents' divorce. Id. at 263. Distinguishing Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), as being the standard only
for determining when a school may punish student expression, the Court concluded that a
school may refuse to lend its name and money for dissemination of student expression.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270-72.
11 See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
90 See Becker, Washington State's New Juvenile Code: An Introduction, 14 GONz. L.
REv. 289, 294 (1979). In Washington, "[f]aw enforcement officers as well as a number of
vocal community action groups had expressed their dissatisfaction with what appeared to be
insensitivity on the part of juvenile courts to public safety and protection." Id.
"' See LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 27, at 38. Some jurisdictions have created another
special category for treatment of "youthful offenders" who are under age 21, but beyond the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Id. at 38 n.3.
912 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). In Thompson, a fifteen-year-
old minor, along with three older accomplices, murdered the defendant's former brother-in-
law by shooting him in the head twice, cutting his throat, abdomen, and chest, chaining his
body to a concrete block, and throwing him in a river. Id. at 819. In rejecting the death
penalty for this heinous crime, the Court stated that "[ilnexperience, less education, and
less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her con-
duct." Id. at 835. It was noted that the death penalty serves two social pur-
poses-retribution and deterrence-both of which the Court found inappropriate for a mi-
nor under age sixteen. Id. at 836-37.
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may well be proportionate punishment for one who murders at age
sixteen or seventeen.93 Thus, the Supreme Court's traditional view
that "offenses by the young represent a failure of family, school,
and the social system,"94 has apparently been replaced by the be-
lief that one need not be mature enough to drive carefully, to drink
responsibly, or to vote intelligently in order to conform one's con-
duct to some minimally civilized standard. 5
In addressing children's privacy rights, the Rehnquist Court
has placed additional obstacles in the path of a minor's right to an
abortion.' In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,97 the
Court upheld a statute requiring notification by the physician to at
least one parent of any minor seeking an abortion. 8 Pursuant to
the statute, this notification was required to precede the abortion
unless a court granted a bypass following a proceeding99 in which
the minor proved maturity or best interests by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.100 The Court cited its decision in Matheson0 1 as au-
9' See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). Two murder cases were consoli-
dated, one involving a minor age 17 years and 4 months at the time of the offense and the
other involving a minor age 16 years and 6 months. Id. at 365-66. In both cases, because of
the seriousness of the offense and the repeated unsuccessful attempts at rehabilitation, the
juvenile court determined that the minor should be tried as an adult. Id. at 366-67. The
Supreme Court found "neither a historical nor a modem societal consensus forbidding the
imposition of capital punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age." Id.
at 380. In contrast to the strongly worded dissent joined by four justices, the majority found
that their decision did not offend the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. Id.
Id. at 395-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 376-77.
01 See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
97 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990).
See id. at 2978-79 (expressly declining to decide issue of whether bypass provision is
necessary in notice statute). '
11 Id. at 2977. The bypass procedure also provided for an expedited appeal. Id. at 2980.
This appeal, however, could take as long as three weeks-a period of time that would be
crucial when considering the health of the minor. Id.
"I0 Id. at 2981-83. In addition to challenging the clear and convincing evidence standard
and the statute's requirement of parental notification, the plaintiffs put forth three other
arguments. Id. at 2979-82. The first alleged that the' pleading requirements breached the
confidentiality of the minor's identity because "[u]nless the minor has counsel, she must
sign a complaint form to initiate the bypass procedure and, even if she has counsel, she
must supply the name of one of her parents at four different places." Id. at 2979-80. The
second challenged the statute's constructive authorization provisions that "enable a minor
to obtain an abortion without notifying one of her parents if either the juvenile court or the
court of appeals fails to act within the prescribed time limits." Id. at 2981. The plaintiff's
fear was that the constructive authorization would be ineffective because in the absence of
an affirmative court order, a physician may be afraid to perform the procedure on a minor.
Id. The last argument offered by the plaintiffs was that the pleading requirements were
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thority for requiring the physician to notify the parent,10 2 and rea-
soned that this intrusion upon a minor's right to privacy was
warranted "because the parents often will provide important medi-
cal data to the physician."103
In a case decided the same day, Hodgson v. Minnesota,0 the
Court, in a split opinion, held unconstitutional a provision of a
state statute that required notification of both parents before a mi-
nor could obtain an abortion. 10 5 Although the Court determined
that the provision requiring two-parent notification was invalid, a
different majority held that the statute as a whole was saved by
the judicial bypass procedure. 10 As a result, the minor was again
given the choice of turning to either her parents or the courts for
aid in making this important decision. 10 7
III. THE FUTURE TREATMENT OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS BY THE
SUPREME COURT
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren, the Supreme
Court substantially modified the traditional perception of chil-
likely to confuse an unrepresented minor and could possibly result in the minor's failure to
plead both maturity and best interests as permitted under Bellotti. Id. at 2982. The Court
dismissed these complaints because of the facial nature of the attack on the statute and
concluded that these provisions could be constitutionally enforced. Id.
"I See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussing Court's decision in
Matheson).
102 Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2983. The Court approved the distinction between re-
quiring a physician to notify a minor's parents of their daughter's wish to obtain an abortion
and obliging him to inform a woman of the routine risks of an abortion. See id.
103 Id. at 2983.
104 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
100 Id. at 2945. The Court found that requiring notification of both parents before al-
lowing a minor to have an abortion does not further any "legitimate" state interest. Id.
Generally, notification and consent provisions are enacted because they "support[] the au-
thority of a parent who is presumed to act in the minor's best interest," thereby assuring
that the minor's decision will be "knowing, intelligent and deliberate." Id. This interest, the
Court held, could be served in a less restrictive manner by requiring notice of just one par-
ent. Id.
'0 Id. at 2970 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Minnesota
statute in issue, INN. STAT. § 144.343(2)-(7) (1988), contained the two-parent notification
requirement in subdivision two, and it was this portion of the statute that was declared
unconstitutional by the Court. Id. at 2926. In subdivision six, however, provision was made
for a judicial bypass procedure to be added to the statute in case "subdivision 2 of this law
is ever temporarily or permanently restrained or enjoined by judicial order." Id. at 2933 n.9.
As a result, the statute still requires notification of both parents, but now the minor is
provided with an option to seek a judicial bypass of the notice requirement by proving ma-
turity or best interests. Id. at 2970 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2971 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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dren's rights.108 During that era, the Court first recognized that mi-
nors possess individual rights and are entitled to be free from un-
reasonable state interference.109  Despite its significant
advancement of children's rights, however, the Warren Court
maintained the view that minors should remain under the broad
control of their parents or the state or both, since their immaturity
and inexperience cause them to lack generally the capacity to regu-
late themselves." 0
Many areas of children's rights were also addressed by the
Burger Court."" During that period, the Court, while demanding
that each child be treated as an individual, continued to define the
limits of children's rights by deferring to the authority of the
state" 2 or the parents," 3 and therefore did little to advance chil-
dren's rights." 4
During its first few years, the Rehnquist Court also failed to
108 See Rush, supra note 4, at 470.
109 Id.
110 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (upholding a state's right to
limit a minor's access to sexually explicit material).
" See supra notes 40-70 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256-57 (1984) (upholding New York statute
authorizing pretrial detention of accused juvenile delinquent if judge finds there is "serious
risk" that child will commit crime before adjudication). The Schall Court held that the
statute served a legitimate state interest and that there were significant procedural safe-
guards to protect the juvenile's due process rights. Id. The Court found unpersuasive the
fact that the majority of minors were not confined after adjudication. Id. at 272. It further
found no indication that the statute was intended to punish the juvenile. Id. at 269. Accord-
ing to the Court, the minor's interest in his freedom
must be qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in
some form of custody .... Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the
capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control
of their parents, and [failing that, of the state as] parens patriae.
Id. at 265.
113 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620-21 (1979) (parents may voluntarily com-
mit minor child to mental health institution). Recognizing the severe "risk of error" in de-
nying minors their liberty, the Court required a "neutral factfinder," such as a staff physi-
cian, to determine whether the statutory requirements of admission were fulfilled. Id. at
606. The rationale for denying a formalized hearing was that forcing the parent and child to
be on opposite sides of an adversarial proceeding would not be in the best interest of the
child. Id. at 610. The Court recognized that a parent possesses what a child lacks in matur-
ity, experience and capacity for making difficult decisions, and that parents generally do act
in the child's best interests. Id.
11 See Note, Children's Rights Under the Burger Court, supra note 1, at 1226. "[T]he
[Burger] Court has shifted the right of guardianship... from the parent to a position of
shared parent-state power." Id. "As a result of this inconsistency, children's rights have
been only minimally advanced." Id.
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advance significantly the individual rights of children. 115 In fact, it
appears that the Court's recent decisions have served to restrict
children's rights further.1 6 Ronald Reagan, during his tenure as
President, contributed to this restrictive trend by creating a solid
conservative block on the Supreme Court. 17 President Bush has
strengthened this block with the appointment of David H. Sou-
ter" and Clarence Thomas," 9 thus furthering the Court's retreat
115 See, e.g., Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2974 (requirement of two-parent notification prior
to daughter's abortion is unconstitutional without procedure for judicial bypass); Hazelwood
School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274-76 (1988) (public school principal's regulation
of student newspaper content); cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-69 (1982)
(school board may not remove books from library shelves merely because it disagrees with
ideas exchanged).
116 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 274-76 (principal's regulation of student-run newspaper
constitutional because it was "reasonable"). Compare Akron Center 110 S. Ct. at 2977-78
(Rehnquist Court upheld statute requiring physician to notify parent of minor's pending
abortion, or alternatively, minor must prove by clear and convincing evidence best interests
or maturity) with Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72-75 (Burger Court struck down blanket parental
consent provision necessary for minors to obtain abortion).
117 See Ingwerson, Bench Grows More Conservative, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June
28, 1990, at 1; Schwartz, Why Bush Will Enhance Reagan's Supreme Court Legacy, MAN-
HATTAN LAWYER, Jan. 17-23, 1989, at 15. "President Reagan installed three relatively young,
quite conservative justices, who-with a relatively young Rehnquist-represent a solid vot-
ing block." Id. Prior to Justice Souter's appointment, the conservative block on the Court
was placed at four and one half Justices, with Justice O'Connor being the one-half because
she carried the swing vote on many high-profile issues. See Ingwerson, supra, at 15.
The personnel changes made to the Court during the Reagan years were brought on by
the resignation of Chief Justice Burger in 1986 and the retirement of Justice Powell in 1987.
See G. GUNTHER, supra note 71, at B-6. Additions to the Court included Justices O'Connor
in 1981, Scalia in 1986, and Kennedy in 1988. Id. Also, Justice Rehnquist was promoted to
the Chief Justiceship in 1986. Id.
118 On July 20, 1990, Justice Brennan retired and was replaced by David H. Souter. G.
GuNTHER, supra note 71, at B-7 n.2. Justice Souter's past record indicates a conservative
lean, but is silent on many issues that he will likely confront on the Supreme Court.
Marcotte, Brennan's Exit Marks the End of An Era, 76 A.B.A. J. 12-13 (Sept. 1990). It
appears, however, that Justice Souter has already aligned himself with the Court's conserva-
tive wing, thus creating a Court "more conservative than any other since the 1920's." Gallo-
way, Balance of Power, 77 A.B.A. J. 74, 75 (May 1991); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 111
S. Ct. 1246, 1261 (1991) (Justice Souter joined four other Justices in part of opinion holding
that use of coerced confession in criminal trial is no longer grounds for automatic reversal of
conviction). Moreover, when Justice Brennan retired, the Court lost a great liberal voice.
See Marcotte, supra, at 12. "Brennan's departure leaves the liberal faction of the court
without its traditional leader." Id.
119 Justice Thurgood Marshall announced his retirement from the Supreme Court on
June 27, 1991. N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1991, at 1, col. 1. Chosen to replace Justice Marshall was
Clarence Thomas. N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1991, at 1, col. 1. Prior to his Supreme Court nomina-
tion, Judge Thomas served on the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington for a year after
serving as Chairman of the Equal Opportunity Commission for eight years. Id. It is specu-
lated that Judge Thomas will further enhance the conservative slant of the Supreme Court.
See id.
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from the protection of individuals against governmental
interference. 120
One area of children's rights that seems likely to suffer further
setbacks under the Rehnquist Court is the minor's right to privacy.
While the views of Justices Souter and Thomas on this issue are
not fully known at this time, a number of other Justices have ex-
pressed their disapproval of the Burger Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade.121 In light of the Court's current outlook, it appears likely
that a minor's right to an abortion will soon be restricted further
or even abolished. 22
120 See Galloway, supra note 118, at 74. "George Bush's advisors plan to push the al-
ready conservative Rehnquist Court further down the slope by appointing more conserva-
tives." Id. Conservatives judges "tend to come down on the government's side . . . against
the individual, urging judicial restraint in the enforcement of civil liberties such as privacy
and free speech." Id. See generally Ingwerson, supra note 117, at 1 ([1]iberals, viewing the
court with alarm, see it retreating steadily from protecting individuals against government
intrusion"); Schwartz, supra note 117, at 15 (Reagan administration "tried to roll back the
civil rights laws and weaken civil rights enforcement, overturn Supreme Court decisions on
abortion and school prayer, and diminish the rights of criminal defendants"); Washington
Post, Jan. 29, 1989, at Al ("[a]ccording to various academic studies, the judges named by
Reagan were far more likely than those selected by... Carter, to reject claims of race or sex
discrimination, rule against criminal defendants, and find that environmental, civil rights
groups and others had no standing to sue").
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040
(1989). In Webster, the Court declined to pass on the constitutionality of the preamble of a
state statute which declared that life begins at conception, but indicated that it would con-
sider the question if the provision were used restrictively. Id. at 3050. The Court did hold,
however, that it was not in violation of Roe for a state to prohibit the use of public facilities
and employees to perform abortions. See id. at 511. This conclusion is likely to have a tre-
mendous effect on pregnant minors, who generally lack the means to obtain an abortion
from a private facility. Id. at 557 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
("every year hundreds of thousands of women, in desperation, w[ill] defy the law, and place
their health and safety in the unclean and unsympathetic hands of back-alley abortionists").
The most significant aspect of Webster, however, was that the Court abolished Roe's trimes-
ter system and upheld a statute that allows doctors to determine viability, thereby estab-
lishing a variable time frame in which states can prohibit abortion. See id. at 552-54.
"2 See Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). "Today, Roe v Wade and the fundamental constitutional right of women to terminate
a pregnancy, survive but are not secure." Id. See generally Stuart, Precedent is More
Honored in the Breach than the Observance: High Court's Conservatives Are Cutting
Down Liberals' Pillars, MLtNALrrAN LAWYER, May 23, 1989, at 10 (in coming years conserva-
tives may be dismantling some established doctrines and precedents, such as abortion).
"Rehnquist and White have explicitly called for overruling Roe v. Wade," id., and Justice
Scalia believes "that the Constitution contains no right to abortion." Ohio v. Akron Center,
110 S. Ct. at 2984 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor has argued that a state's interest
is compelling not only after viability but throughout the pregnancy, since there is a "poten-
tial human life" all through the pregnancy. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 459-60 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). It appears that these
four Justices will make it very difficult to expand the right of privacy of both minors and
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It also seems probable that the Rehnquist Court's tendency to
curtail the protections afforded juvenile criminals will continue in
the future. Although the Court has recently stated that "less cul-
pability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a
comparable crime committed by an adult, ' 123 its acceptance of the
death penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old minors convicted
of first degree murder evidences the Court's support for the severe
treatment of minors who commit serious criminal acts.124
Despite the Rehnquist Court's seeming penchant for reducing
the safeguards afforded minors, it is probable that the Court will
uphold expanded efforts by the states to shield children who have
fallen victim to sexual abuse. 2 5 The Court's recently exhibited
willingness to impose limitations on the criminal defendant's right
to confrontation in sexual abuse cases is consistent with its policy
of stricter penalties and diminished protections for criminal de-
fendants.126 Furthermore, in yiew of the growing conservatism on
the Court, it appears likely that the child will be afforded addi-
tional protections against the adult defendant, who, with today's




During the Warren Court era, cases deciding children's issues
reiterated the traditional principle that parents have a constitu-
tional right to control the upbringing of their children, but, at the
same time, asserted the new idea that children are "persons"
within the meaning of the Constitution and are thus entitled to
constitutional protections. The Burger Court was perhaps the first
to give serious consideration to this conflict between the constitu-
tional rights of parents and children. Instead of automatically rele-
adult women who are considering having abortions.
2 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988).
124 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
25 See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
126 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1261 (1991) (Relnquist, C.J. dissenting)
(concluding that coerced or involuntary confession may not be fatal to case, and may consti-
tute harmless error); Galloway, supra note 118, at 75 (Court has weakened rule against un-
reasonable searches and seizures).
127 See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3162 (1990) ("essence" preserved when de-
fendant may observe and cross-examine witness and have jury observe demeanor of wit-
ness); see also Comment, Videotaped Child Testimony, supra note 77, at 366 n.50 (recent
technological changes may make it necessary to redefine "face-to-face").
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gating children to the control of their parents, the Court often sub-
stituted the state's authority as parens patriae.
More recent Supreme Court decisions concerning minors indi-
cate a protective bent on the issues of abortion and of the appear-
ance of child witnesses in sexual abuse cases, but a continuing
trend away from the benevolent juvenile justice system envisioned
by Progressives on the issue of juvenile delinquency. With regard
to abortion and child witnesses, the Court has exhibited a modified
traditional view; it has noted that although minors may be incapa-
ble of acting independently, they are also unlikely to have an
"ideal" family to shelter them and therefore must receive protec-
tion and guidance from the state. In the case of juvenile delin-
quents, it is likely that the growing conservatism on the Court will
continue to increase the similarities between the juvenile and adult
criminal systems. However, it is unlikely that the juvenile system
will be done away with completely, since minors are still generally
considered to have a diminished capacity to commit criminal acts
willfully.
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